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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
CITY OF AUBURN v. U.S. GOVERNMENT 
154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In City of Auburn v. U.S. Government; the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the plain lan-
guage of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination 
Act (lCCTA) preempts state and local permitting laws regard-
ing railroad operations.2 The court reasoned that since the IC-
CTA gave the Surface Transportation Board (Board), a federal 
agency, exclusive jurisdiction over certain railroad matters, 
railroad companies were required to follow only federal permit-
ting laws, not those of a state or city.3 Thus, Burlington North-
ern Railroad (Burlington) is not subject to the environmental 
permitting laws of the city of Auburn (Auburn). 4 
1. 154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the Surface Transportation 
Board was argued and submitted on June 3, 1998 before Judge Donald P. Lay, Judge 
Goodwin, and Judge Preger80n. The opinion, authored by Judge Lay, was flIed on 
September 3, 1998. 
2. See City of Auburn v. V.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025, at 1033 (9th Cir. 1998). 
"The ICCTA abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission, created the [Surface 
Transportation Boardl, and granted the board jurisdiction over certain interstate rail 
functions and proceedings." [d. at 1028 n.3. See also the ICC Termination Act of 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 49 V.S.C.). 
The ICCTA went into effect on January I, 1996 and although the issue of federal pre-
emption over matters of interstate commerce is not new, this was the first time the 
Ninth Circuit had to rule on ICCTA's preemption specifically. See City of Auburn, 154 
F.3d at 1030. 
3. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1030. The ICCTA provides "[tlhe jurisdiction of 
the Board over (1) transportation by rail carriers ... ; and (2) ... acquisition ... is exclu-
sive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part 
with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the reme-
dies provided under Federal or State law." 49 V.S.C. § 10501(b) (Supp. II 1997). 
4. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1028. 
80 
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The court also held that the Board did not abuse its discre-
tion in approving Burlington's proposal to reacquire the Stam-
pede Pass railroad line without conducting a full Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS).5 The court determined that 
the Board's sixty-page environmental assessment (EA),6 consti-
tuted a "thorough, independent investigation of the environ-
mental consequences" of reopening Stampede Pass. 7 Thus, the 
investigation was sufficient to satisfy the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA).8 Consequently, the Board's decision 
not to conduct an EIS was neither arbitrary nor capricious and 
was therefore upheld. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the early 1980s, Burlington operated Stampede Pass, a 
229-mile railway line in Washington through the Cascade 
Mountains. 9 In 1986, it sold the eastern 151-mile stretch to 
Washington Central Railroad.lO However, Burlington contin-
ued to operate the seventy-eight-mile western section between 
5. See id. at 1033. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1994), requires all federal agencies to prepare a statement, called 
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), detailing the environmental consequences 
of all "Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 
42 U .S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994). 
6. Pursuant to Section 150B.9 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, an 
agency is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) to aid in determining 
whether an EIS will be required by NEPA. Section 150B.9 provides: 
Erwironmental Assessment: 
(a) Means a concise public document for which a Federal agency is respon· 
sible that serves to: 
(1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether 
to prepare an environmental impact statement or a fmding of no significant 
impact. 
(2) Aid an agency's compliance with the Act when no environmental impact 
statement is necessary. 
(3) Facilitate preparation of a statement when one is necessary. 
(b) Shall include brjef discussions of the need for the proposal, of alterna· 
tives as required by sec. 102(2)(E), of the environmental impacts of the pro· 
posed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted. 
40 C.F.R. § 150B.9 (199B). 
7. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1032. 
B. ld. at 1033. 
9 .. See City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 199B). 
Auburn lies at the west end ofthe line and Pasco at the east end. See id. 
10. See id. at 1027. 
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the cities of Cle Elum and Auburn. 11 In 1996, Burlington 
sought to reacquire the 151-mile eastern portion of Stampede 
Pass, and requested the Board's approval. 12 As a part of the 
reacquisition, Burlington proposed to complete repairs and im-
provements on the line, thus reestablishing the line as a third 
main rail to the Pacific Northwest. 13 Burlington initially sub-
mitted local permit applications for this project. 14 However, 
during the review process it asserted that the local permitting 
laws were preempted by federal regulation, specifically the IC-
CTAul 
Prompted by Burlington's claim of federal preemption, King 
County, Washington sought a declaration by the Board clari-
fying whether the ICCTA preempted state and local permitting 
laws. 16 The Board responded affirmatively and issued an in-
formal declaration}' The declaration stated that the ICCTA 
precluded King County from reviewing the environmental im-
pact of Burlington's proposed operations on the Stampede Pass 
line. 18 In August 1996, King County requested a formal decla-
ration, which the Board issued on September 25, 1996.19 
At the same time, pursuant to federal law, the Board con-
ducted an EA of Burlington's proposal to reacquire, repair and 
improve the Stampede Pass.2O The EA concluded that the proj-
ect would have no significant environmental impact if certain 
mitigation measures were implemented. 21 Thus, the Board ap-
11. See id. Cle Elum lies along the Stampede Pass line between Auburn and Pasco. 
See id. 
12. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1027-28. 
13. See id. at 1028. Some of the improvements included -replacement of track 
siding and snow sheds, tunnel improvements and communication towers." Id. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. See City of Auburn, 154 F .3d at 1028. 
17. Seeid. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. See ill. at 1028-29. 
21. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1029. 
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proved Burlington's proposal in October 1996.22 Auburn then 
appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. 23 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the sovereignty of federal law 
over local law with respect to interstate commerce. 24 Beginning 
with an historical analysis, the court noted cases that recog-
nized the long-established exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
railroad operations.25 Most cases held "mocal authorities have 
no power to regulate interstate rail passengers. "26 With specific 
regard to the ICCTA, they held that a broad interpretation of 
ICCTA preemption over state regulation was consistent with 
the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction. 'J:1 Thus, state 
laws affecting railroads were subject to the "plenary and exclu-
sive" power of the federal government.28 
Auburn contended that case law supported a narrower in-
terpretation· of the federal government's ability to pre-empt 
state law.29 However, the court rejected Auburn's argument 
holding that "[a]ll cases cited by the parties [adopted] a broad 
22. See id. 
23. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1029. Auburn also appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit another decision by the Board. See id. at 1028 n.5. Shortly before the Board had 
issued its formal declaratory order to King County, Auburn had requested to be desig-
nated as a party of record in the proceeding. See id. at 1028. The Board denied the 
request suggesting that Auburn submit its own petition for a declaratory order. See id. 
Once Auburn complied, however, the Board denied the petition and claimed that it was 
essentially a request to reconsider the declaratory order requested by King County. 
See id. The Ninth Circuit dismissed this issue on appeal as moot because Auburn 
would not have received any new relief. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1028 n.5. 
24. See City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998). 
25. See id. at 1029 (citing Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 
342,350-52 (1914); Pittsburg & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 
U.S. 490,510 (1989)). 
26. City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1029 (citing City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. 
Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1958); Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 165-66 (1926)). 
27. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1030 (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub-
lic Services Comm'n, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1581 (N. D. Ga. 1996); Burlington Northern 
Santa Fe Corp. v. Anderson, 959 F. Supp. 1288, 1294-95 (D. Mont. 1997)). 
28. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1029. 
29. See id at 1030. 
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reading of Congress' preemption intent, not a narrow one. "30 
Thus, interstate commerce, and railroads, had been and will 
continue to be governed exclusively by federal authority. 
The court then denounced Auburn's reliance on ICCTA's 
legislative history for the meaning and intent of the ICCTA.31 
Auburn argued that Congress intended the ICCTA to preempt 
only state and local "economic regulation of rail transportation, 
not the traditional state police power of environmental 
review.n32 The court, however, dismissed this argument, rmd-
ing the language of the ICCTA to be clear.33 A statute's lan-
guage is conclusive when it is clear on its face. 34 Reliance on 
legislative history, therefore, is proper only when the purpose 
or intent of a statute is ambiguous or misleading. 35 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the clear language of the 
ICCTA expressly granted the federal government, specifically 
the Board, exclusive authority over projects like Stampede 
Pass.36 In so deciding, the court relied on section 10501(b)(2) of 
the ICCTA.37 This section commands the Board to exercise ex-
clusive jurisdiction over ''the construction, acquisition, opera-
tion, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, 
switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are lo-
cated, or intended to be located, entirely within one State."38 
Further, the court noted language in section 11321 precluding 
"state and municipal laws" from interfering with merger or ac-
quisition transactions.39 On this basis, the court held that the 
30. Id. 
31. See id. at 1029-30. 
32. Id. at 1029. Auburn relied on a Congressional report, which stated that Con-
gress meant to "occupy [ I the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate rail 
transportation system," but leave for the states "the police powers reserved by the 
Constitution." H. R. Rep. No. 104-311, 104th Cong., 1st Sess, at 95-96 (1995), reprinted 
in 1995 V.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 807-08 (alteration in original). 
33. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1030. 
34. See id. at 1029. 
35. See id. at 1030. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1030 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (1997)). See 
supra note 3 for text of § 10501(b)(2). 
39. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1030 (citing 49 V.S.C. § 11321(a) (1997)). Sec-
tion 11321(a) states: 
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clear language of the ICCTA preempted any state regulation of 
railroads. 40 
Auburn then attempted to limit ICCTA's jurisdiction over 
the state by distinguishing local environmental laws from those 
laws Congress intended to preempt. 41 Auburn's position was 
that Congress did not intend to limit the traditional state police 
power necessary to protect the health and safety of its 
citizens. 42 The court disagreed for two reasons. First, courts 
had only allowed state law to preempt federal law in the rare 
cases where a specific federal statute had clearly so intended. 43 
Second, the court saw a lack of clear distinction between eco-
nomic and environmental regulation.44 The court reasoned that 
if "local authorities have the ability to impose 'environmental' 
permitting regulations on the railroad, such power will in fact 
amount to 'economic regulation' if the carrier is prevented from 
constructing, acquiring, operating, abandoning or discontinu-
ing aline. "45 Thus, the court concluded that all state and local 
permitting laws, including environmental regulations, were 
explicitly preempted by the ICCTA 46 
B. NEPA REVIEW 
The Ninth Circuit began their review of the Board's decision 
not to prepare an EIS by acknowledging that appellate courts 
generally give great deference to an agency's determination 
The authority of the Board under this subchapter is exclusive .... A rail car· 
rier, corporation, or person participating in that approved or exempted trans-
action is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law, including 
State and municipal law, as necessary to let that rail carrier, corporation or 
person carry out the transaction, hold, maintain, and operate property, and 
exercise the control or franchises acquired through the transaction." 
49 U .S.C. § 11321(a) (1997). 
40. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1030. 
41. See id. at 1031. 
42. See id. at 1029. 
43. See id. at 1031. The Ninth Circuit cited to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 
726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984), where it had allowed an Alaska statute to govern the 
discharge of ballast by oil tankers. Chevron, 726 F.2d at 489. In Chevron, the court 
found the Clean Water Act to have clearly "expressed its intent to allow the states to 
take an active role in abating water pollution." [d. 
44. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1031. 
45. [d. 
46. See id. 
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regarding NEPA requirements.47 The court reasoned, "[w]e are 
not free to substitute our judgment for that of the agency as to 
the environmental consequences of its actions .... Instead, our 
task is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately consid-
ered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions .... "48 
Therefore, a court will overturn an agency's decision not to 
conduct a full EIS only if that decision was "arbitrary, capri-
cious or an abuse of discretion. "49 
Auburn, however, argued that the Board abused its discre-
tion.1IO Auburn asserted that the Board not only failed to take a 
"hard look" at the environmental consequences of reopening 
Stampede Pass,1I1 but also failed to analyze alternatives. 112 
Moreover, Auburn claimed that the mitigation measures pro-
posed by the Board did not compensate for the environmental 
harm to support a "finding of no significant impact."1IS 
47. See City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th Cir. 1998). 
48. [d. (quoting Association of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc., v. Bonneville Power 
Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1183 (9th Cir.1997». 
49. City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1032 (citing Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 
F.3d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992». For the Ninth Circuit, this standard of review became 
more complicated after Alaska Wilderness Recreation &: Tourism v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 
723 (9th Cir. 1995), which assumed the standard of 'reasonableness' to apply to thresh-
old decisions concerning the applicability ofNEPA. See Alaska Wilderness, 67 F.3d at 
727. Subsequent case law has reconciled Greenpeace and Alaska WilderneBB to hold 
that, in the Ninth Circuit, legal issues regarding NEPA applicability are governed by 
the -reasonableness- standard while factual issues are governed by the -arbitrary and 
capricious" standard. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 
660, 667 (9th Cir. 1998), see also Lisa Braly, Summary Northcoast Environmental 
Center II. Glickman, 29 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 89 (1999), for discussion of North-
coast. The rationale underlying this distinction is the expertise of the courts, or lack 
thereof, in agency matters. See Alaska WilderneBB, 67 F.3d at 727. The less deferential 
standard of reasonableness is applied to legal issues, of which the courts are suffi-
ciently knowledgeable. See id. On the other hand, courts know less about the factual 
issues and, therefore, use the more deferential standard with factual questions. See id. 
50. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1032. 
51. See id. Auburn believed that the increased traffic and noise in the city should 
have been investigated within the EA. See id. at 1032-33. 
52. See id. at 1032. Section 1508.9(b) of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions requires an EA to include a discussion of the proposal and its alternatives as well 
as any environmental impacts the proposal or the alternatives may have. 40 C.F.R. § 
1508.9(b) (1998). See supra note 6 for the text of§ 1508.9(b). 
53. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1032. Auburn asserted that the mitigation 
measures were -Vague, conclusory, and ineffective." [d. 
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The court rejected Auburn's arguments on the basis that the 
EA was a thorough investigation that addressed several envi-
ronmental concerns. 54 In addition, the court noted that the 
Board provided a list of mitigation measures, as required by 
the regulations, and had specifically tailored three measures to 
address Auburn's concern over traffic delays at rail crossings. 116 
The Board "observed the appropriate procedural requirements, 
allowed public comment, and properly informed the public of 
the environmental issues."56 The Board met its requirements 
under NEPA's statutory guidelines and thus, the court af-
firmed the Board's rulings. 57 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
The dissolution of the Interstate Commerce Commission by 
the ICCTA has created considerable confusion over the status 
of commercial transportation regulation in some transportation 
industries.58 However, the simultaneous creation of the Sur-
face Transportation Board alleviated much of this uncertainty 
with respect to the railroads. Section 10501 of the ICCTA es-
sentially gave the Board the same jurisdiction and authority as 
its predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission. 59 Thus, 
subsequent cases regarding the regulation of railroads, in-
cluding City of Auburn, are not greatly affected by the change. 
Novel arguments for state and local intervention may be made, 
but as the court in City of Auburn has shown, courts are un-
54. See id. at 1032. The EA addressed -rail traffic increases, transportation 
safety, energy, air quality, and noise." ld. 
55. See City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1032 & n.6. The three measures the Board 
developed were (1) notice of expected train movements, (2) discussion of funding op-
tions for crossing upgrades, and (3) spacing of train movements to allow time for 
crossings to clear. See id. at 1033. However, the Board denied Auburn's suggestion of 
requiring the construction of grade-separated crossings. See id. 
56. City of Auburn, 154 F .3d at 1033. 
57. See id. 
58. See Mark W. Flory et al., Recent Developments in Commercial Transportation 
Litigation, 33 TORT & INS. L. J. 343, 344 (1998). The confusion about the deregulation 
concerned its practical impact in areas other than the railroad industry. See id. For 
example, the Board assumed the ICC's responsibility for the transportation of ~ouse­
hold goods, noncontiguous motor trade, passenger travel, undercharges and collective 
rate making." ld. However, the ICCTA -abolished most economic regulations and 
eliminated certification and permit requirements." ld. 
59. See id. at 344. 
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willing to divest the federal government of its longstanding 
right to exclusive jurisdiction over interstate rail travel. Until 
the federal government begins to concede some of its exclusive 
authority, states will have to rely on federal regulations, rather 
than their own, to protect the environment. 
Lisa Braly· 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 2000. 
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